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Abstract—This article is focused on the family of role-based
trust management languages (RT). Trust management lan-
guages are a useful method of representing security creden-
tials and policies in large distributed access control mecha-
nisms. They provide sets of credentials that are assigned to
individual roles performed by the specific entities. These cre-
dentials provide relevant information about security policies
issued by trusted authorities and define user permissions. RT
languages describe the individual entities and the roles that
these entities play in a given environment. A set of credentials
representing a given security policy defines which entity has
the necessary rights to access a specific resource and which
entity does not have such rights. This study presents the re-
sults of research focusing on the potential of the family of RT
languages. Its purpose is to show how security policies may
be applied more widely by applying an inference system, and
then using the extensions of the credentials, by taking into ac-
count time-related information or the conditions imposed with
regard to the validity of such credentials. Each of these exten-
sions can be used jointly or separately, offering even a wider
range of opportunities.
Keywords—access control, conditional credentials, inference
system with time constraints.
1. Introduction
Confidential services and data stored in a computer sys-
tem should be available to authorized users only. There-
fore, attempting to guarantee that kind of access control
is an extremely important and difficult task. This problem
should be resolved by using reliable and trusted software
technologies that are relied upon to design high-integrity
applications.
Traditional solutions used in the aforementioned scenarios
include such access control as discretionary access con-
trol (DAC) [2], mandatory access control (MAC) [1], and
role-based access control (RBAC) [3]) (which offers the
highest degree of flexibility). These methods are charac-
terized by the fact that after identification of the user (or
the role they play), access to the resources or the system
is granted or not. The owner of the specific resource must
first know the identity of the requester. This approach may
turn out to be sufficient in systems in which user identities
are known. Unfortunately, this is not the case with open
systems, where the user’s identity is not known in advance,
and where the resource owner and the requester often do
not know each other. For example, if you are a student and
you have a city card, you can use a scooter for free. When
such a student visits a place renting electric scooters, it
does not matter who they are. Their identity will not be
required in order to get a free scooter ride. In this case, two
types of credentials are relevant. One confirming that the
person is a student, and the other in the form of a city card.
Your identity is not useful for making the decision about
the rights you are entitled to. The decision can be made
based on a certificate or other credentials informing about
your rights. These certificates must be issued by the rele-
vant authority. Therefore, a different approach to managing
access control has been defined.
Blaze et al. [4] defined trust management as a unified ap-
proach to define and interpret security credentials, poli-
cies and trust relationships. A credential certifies certain
qualifications, competences or authority issued to some-
body by a third party. Credentials provide information about
the user’s permissions and the security policies issued by
at least one trusted authority. Identification documents,
driver’s licenses, academic diplomas, certificates, etc. may
serve as good examples of credentials.
The task of the family of role-based trust management lan-
guages is to represent security credentials and policies in
distributed access control systems, and to provide a set of
credentials helping you assign roles to users. The core lan-
guage of the family of RT languages is RT0, as described
in [5]. All subsequent languages add new features to RT0.
RT1 adds parameterized roles to RT0, representing relation-
ships between the specific entities. RT2 introduces logical
objects that you can use to define permissions granted to
entities that form a group of logically related objects. This
article focuses on the RT T language, because it provides
useful features (not found in others languages): manifold
roles and role-product operators that can express threshold
values and separation of duties policies. A more detailed
description of the RT family of languages may be found
in [6].
Since the creation of the base RT family language, many
different works have been created that are related to the
potential uses of RT. These works include, inter alia, the
role-based trust management model used in peer-to-peer
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networks [7], wireless sensor networks [8], [9] or cloud
computing [10]. In this work, we present certain exten-
sions of the most advanced RT family language. These
extensions will enable the language to be used in many
real-world situations. The study shows how the RT family
of languages may become more easily applicable in real
systems by enabling validity time limits and by introducing
parameterization of credentials. So far, the proposed mod-
els did not allow for easy application of time restrictions in
connection with security policies or credentials issued. It
was also not easy to use conditional credentials. The pro-
posed extensions of the basic language will be presented in
the form of simple usage scenarios described in the subse-
quent sections of this document.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the syntax of RT languages. The infer-
ence system over RT T language is described in Section 3.
Section 4 describes two extensions of the RT T language
(time validity and conditional credentials). Section 5 shows
an inference system over the new RT T+ language. Use case
scenarios that validate usability of the extensions are pre-
sented in Section 6. Final remarks are given in the con-
clusions.
2. The Syntax of RT Family Languages
Entities, roles, role names and credentials are the basic el-
ements of RT languages. Entities may represent principals
that define roles and issue credentials. They may also issue
credentials and request access to resources. In a computer
system, an entity may have the form of a program identi-
fied the user account. Roles are sets of entities with specific
permissions, granted in accordance with the access control
policy. Role names represent permissions that specific enti-
ties issue to other entities or entity sets. Credentials define
a new role member (or a set of role members) and delegate
authority to members of other roles.
The following are the types of credentials found in the RT
family of languages. The first six appear in basic RT T , and
two additional ones are connected with the determination of
the order in which credentials may appear. The individual
credentials should be understood as follows:
K.r← L – a member of role K.r is entity L (sim-
ple membership).
K.r← L.s – members of role K.r are all members
of role L.s (simple inclusion).
K.r← L.s.t – role K.r contains role M.t for each M,
which is a member of role L.s (linking
inclusion).
K.r← L.s∩M.t – role K.r contains all the entities that
are members of role L.s and role M.t
(intersection inclusion).
K.r← L.sM.t – to be a member of role K.r you must
be a union set of one member of role
L.s and one member of the role M.t.
K.r← L.s⊗M.t – role K.r contains one member of role
L.s and one member of role M.t. The
members of the roles must be different
entities in this case.
K.r← L.s→M.t – to be a member of role K.r you must
be a union set of one member of role
L.s and one member of role M.t – in
this specific order.
K.r← L.s⊗→M.t – role K.r contains one member of role
L.s and one member of role M.t in
this specific order. The members of
the roles must be different entities in
this case.
3. Inference System over RT T
Credentials
RT T credentials define roles and roles represent permis-
sions. The set of role members may be calculated by using
an inference system. This system consists of an initial set
of formulae recognized as true and a set of inference rules
by means of which new formulae can be obtained.
If S is a set of given RT T credentials, the application of
inference rules in the inference system will allow to obtain
new credentials from the given set S . Derived credential
s will be denoted by formula S  s, which means that
credential s may be obtained from set of credentials S .
At the beginning, we have the following set of formulae:
s∈S for each credential s in S . The rules of the inference




S  K.r← L.s S  L.s← X
S  K.r← X
(W2)
S  K.r← L.s.t S  L.s←M
S M.t ← X
S  K.r← X
(W3)
S  K.r← L.s∩M.t S  L.s← X
S M.t ← X
S  K.r← X
(W4)
S  K.r← L.sM.t S  L.s← X
S M.t ← Y
S  K.r← X ∪Y
(W5)
S  K.r← L.s⊗M.t S  L.s← X
S M.t ← Y X ∩Y = φ
S  K.r← X ∪Y
(W6)
S  K.r← L.s→M.t S  L.s← X
S M.t ← Y
S  K.r← X ∪Y
(W7)
S  K.r← L.s⊗→M.t S  L.s← X
S M.t ← Y X ∩Y = φ
S  K.r← X ∪Y
(W8)
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The above inference system shows how new credentials can
be inferred using all possible credentials found in RT T .
We add newly created credentials to the already existing
set, thus expanding the initial set of credentials in a given
security policy.
4. Credential Extensions
Here we will introduce two RT T language extensions that
may help apply this language more easily to systems with
practical implications. These extensions include the valid-
ity of temporary credentials (time-based definition of poli-
cies and individual credentials is possible) and conditional
credentials.
4.1. Time Validity in RT T
The first extension shows how easy it is to limit the time
of operation of a given credential. You can define different
validity ranges for credentials. Time limits have already
been used in RT0 to some extent in [11]. However, this
paper shows a different approach to time restrictions, so
that they can be used in RT T languages.
The introduction of such a restriction may result in ob-
taining a permission that is valid for a certain period of
time only. It is quite natural to assume that permissions
are not granted indefinitely. Temporary credentials can be
written as; s in τ , which means that “the credential s is
available at time τ”. Time-dependent credentials sets are
denoted by T S . The newly created language is called
RT T+ . To lighten the notation, we can write s which means
“s in (−∞, +∞)”, i.e. credential without time limits.
The most commonly used trust management languages are
monotonic, meaning that the addition of a new assertion
to a query cannot cancel an action that has already been
approved [12]. This precludes the use of permission nega-
tion. This is a potential source of problems, as any cre-
dential or policy statement added to the system can only
increase the privileges and opportunities granted to others.
This is a very impractical approach, although convenient for
implementation and modeling. The time limits presented
above can sometimes satisfy the need for negation without
actually sacrificing the monotonicity of the system.
Time validity can be determined as follows:
[t1, t2]; [t1, t2);(t1, t2];(t1, t2);(−∞, t];(−∞, t); [t,+∞);(t,+∞);
(−∞, +∞);τ1∪ τ2;τ1∩ τ2;τ1\τ2
and τ1, τ2 of any form in this list, with t ranging over time
constants.
4.2. Conditional Credentials
The second, very intuitive and extremely important exten-
sion of the RT T+ language is connected with the fulfillment
of the condition of one credential being based on availabil-
ity or unavailability of another credential during the check-
ing and implementation phase of this credential. This can
be written as follows:
if entity ∈//∈ roles then credential





then L.con f irm← {Claire,Rita,Kim}
to show that if Kim is a member of role L.controller but not
a member of role L.spec jalEmployees, and a group of enti-
ties {Claire,Rita} is a member of role L.spec jalEmployees
but not a member of role L.controller, then the group of
people consisting of Claire, Rita, and Kim can make the
confirmation.
Another credential is:
if Julia/∈L.active then Julia. f inancial← L.assistspecialist
stating that whenever Julia is not an active worker (she is
on holiday or is no longer working), her assistant can take
care of all financial issues. Julia′s status is described dur-
ing the execution context when the credential is used. The
Julia. f inancial← L.assistspecialist credential is available
if L.active← Julia cannot be inferred. If, in the execu-
tion context, we are able to obtain credential L.active←
Julia in τ , where τ is the validity time of the creden-
tial, then, credential Julia. f inancial← L.assistspecialist is
available at any time not included in τ .
This is also useful in a situation in which we want to check
whether entity L is a member of role K.r or not, and to add
it if it is not.
if L /∈ K.r then K.r← L
if Julia /∈ L.active then L.active← Julia
which adds Julia as an active worker.
This is a common conditional replacement scenario that is
especially useful in the RT T language, as the rule is used
stating that a single person who plays an important role
should be replaced by a pair (or more) of stand-ins acting
together.
The two simple language extensions pertaining to the RT
family, as presented above, although simple and intuitive,
may considerably increase the applicability of RT languages
in real systems. Both time constraints (which partly replace
negation) and dependence on the enforceability of one cre-
dential based on the availability of another, find a lot of
real system applications.
5. Inference System for RT T Credentials
with Time Validity
This section shows how we adjusted the RT T inference
system to the RT T+ credentials inference system.
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If T S is a set of given RT T+ credentials, the application of
inference rules from the inference system will allow to ob-
tain new credentials from the given set T S . The obtained
credential s valid during time t will be denoted by formula
T S t s, meaning that credential s may be derived from
credential set T S at time t.
At the beginning, we have the following set of formulae:
s in τ ∈T S for each credential s valid at time τ in T S .
The rules of the inference system are as follows:
s in τ ∈T S t ∈ τ
T S t s
(CW1)
T S t K.r← L.s T S t L.s← X
T S t K.r← X
(CW2)
T S t K.r← L.s.t T S t L.s←M
T S t M.t ← X
T S t K.r← X
(CW3)
T S t K.r← L.s∩M.t T S t L.s← X
T S t M.t ← X
T S t K.r← X
(CW4)
T S t K.r← L.sM.t T S t L.s← X
T S t M.t ← Y
T S t K.r← X ∪Y
(CW5)
T S t K.r← L.s⊗M.t T S t L.s← X
T S t M.t← Y X ∩Y = φ
T S t K.r← X ∪Y
(CW6)
T S t K.r← L.s→M.t T S t L.s← X
T S t M.t ← Y
T S t K.r← X ∪Y
(CW7)
T S t K.r← L.s⊗→M.t T S t L.s← X
T S t M.t← Y X ∩Y = φ
T S t K.r← X ∪Y
(CW8)
The inference system presented above shows how new cre-
dentials can be inferred using all possible credentials found
in RT T+ . As it was the case in previous inference systems,
we add the newly created credentials to those that already
exist and, thus, expand our collection of credentials avail-
able within a specific security policy.
The first formula says that if we have credential s in the set
of credentials T S at time τ and, at the same time, t is
contained in τ , we can add credential T S t s to the set
of our credentials.
The (CW2) formula says “if in the set of credentials T S
credential K.r← L.s and credential L.s← X are available
during the time t, then we can conclude that K.r ← X
is true during time t and we can add it to our set of cre-
dentials”.
Way we proceed correspondingly by applying new creden-
tials from the set of available T S credentials, which we
add to our initial set.
5.1. Inferring Time Validity of Credentials
To determine the maximum validity time of a given creden-
tial s in the T S inference system, we need to strengthen
the formula T S t s to T S τ s, which means that in
each time period t ∈ τ in which the credential set T S has
semantics, you can deduce credential s from T S . Below
is the newly created inference system:
s in τ ∈T S
T S τ s
(CWP1)
T S τ1 K.r← L.s T S τ2 L.s← X
T S τ1∩τ2 K.r← X
(CWP2)
T S τ1 K.r← L.s.t
T S τ2 L.s←M T S τ3 M.t ← X
T S τ1∩τ2∩τ3 K.r← X
(CWP3)
T S τ1 K.r← L.s∩M.t
T S τ2 L.s← X T S τ3 M.t ← X
T S τ1∩τ2∩τ3 K.r← X
(CWP4)
T S τ1 K.r← L.sM.t
T S τ2 L.s← X T S τ3 M.t ← Y
T S τ1∩τ2∩τ3 K.r← X ∪Y
(CWP5)
T S τ1 K.r← L.s⊗M.t
T S τ2 L.s← X T S τ3 M.t ← Y
X ∩Y = φ
T S τ1∩τ2∩τ3 K.r← X ∪Y
(CWP6)
T S τ1 K.r← L.s

→M.t
T S τ2 L.s← X T S τ3 M.t ← Y
T S τ1∩τ2∩τ3 K.r← X ∪Y
(CWP7)
T S τ1 K.r← L.s
⊗
→M.t
T S τ2 L.s← X T S τ3 M.t ← Y
X ∩Y = φ
T S τ1∩τ2∩τ3 K.r← X ∪Y
(CWP8)
T S τ1 s T S τ2 s
T S τ1∪τ2 s
(CWP9)
In order to infer the maximum validity of credentials, it
is necessary to introduce the maximum validity of time at
each stage of the inference process. The last rule (CWP9)
must be applied as much as possible.
6. Use Case Scenarios
This section aims at presenting very simple cases in which
the inference system is used in connection with RT T+ lan-
guage credentials. These scenarios are intended to verify
usefulness of the presented RT T language extensions.
6.1. First Scenario – Bank Security Policy
At first, the use of credentials without any restrictions
will be shown. Then, we will add restrictions resulting
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from the time when the person concerned performs a spe-
cific role.
Let us consider that we need two out of four guards to open
the main treasury.
F.guards← F.guard⊗F.guard (1)
Furthermore, we want to have two guards and one main
guard, who may also be a regular guard.
F.open← F.mGuardF.guards (2)
As may be observed, this can be written by using only one
credential. There is no need to list all guards and determine
the set of people needed to meet the requirements of his
specific bank’s security policy.
Let us now assign the people who perform the individual







Taking into account the requirements of the bank’s security
policy, any pair from the set {Frank,Susan,Evan,Victor}
can act as two out of four guards. However, opening
the main treasury requires the presence of Victor (it may
be a pair of people with Victor or two other guards and
Victor), or the presence of Eve as an additional guard.
If in our scenario, it is assumed that the bank’s employees
perform individual roles only for a certain period of time,
which will render this example a closer reflection of reality.
In fact, people at work also play a specific role at a certain
point in time. To achieve that objective, we need to gen-
eralize credentials (3)–(8) by introducing time ranges for
their validity:
F.guard←{Frank} in τ1 (9)
F.guard←{Susan} in τ2 (10)
F.guard← {Evan} in τ3 (11)
F.guard←{Victor} in τ4 (12)
F.mGuard←{Victor} in τ5 (13)
F.mGuard← {Eve} in τ6 (14)
stating that (3)–(8) are met only during τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4,
τ5, and during τ6, respectively, while the credentials (1)
and (2) are always valid, because they express certain facts
that do not depend on time.
Now, using the credentials (1), (2) and (9)–(14), we
can deduce those couples who can open the main trea-
sury. The given set of credentials shows that the set
{Frank,Susan,Victor} can jointly open the treasury at
time τ1 ∩ τ2 ∩ τ5 or {Susan,Victor} during the time
τ2 ∩ τ4 ∩ τ5.
Let us now move to the inference system with time-limited
credentials. According to rule (CWP1), we infer the valid-
ity period of the credentials in the following manner:
F.guards← F.guard⊗F.guard ∈ T S
T S  F.guards← F.guard⊗F.guard
F.openTreasury← F.mGuardF.guards∈ T S
T S  F.openTreasury← F.mGuardF.guards
F.guard← {Frank} in τ1 ∈T S
T S τ1 F.guard← {Frank}
F.guard←{Susan} in τ2 ∈ T S
T S τ2 F.guard← {Susan}
F.guard←{Evan} in τ3 ∈ T S
T S τ3 F.guard←{Evan}
F.guard← {Victor} in τ4 ∈ T S
T S τ4 F.guard← {Victor}
F.mGuard←{Victor} in τ5 ∈T S
T S τ5 F.mGuard← {Victor}
F.mGuard←{Eve} in τ6 ∈ T S
T S τ6 F.mGuard←{Eve}
There is no need to use all credentials to infer whatever is
of interest for us. For example, when we want to check
the time interval in which two different guards may work
together, we take into account credentials (1), (10), (12)
and rule (CWP6), and based thereon we conclude that:
T S  F.guards← F.guard⊗F.guard
T S τ2 F.guard← {Susan}
T S τ4 F.guard← {Victor}
{Susan}∩{Victor}= φ
T S τ2∩τ4 F.guards← {Susan,Victor}
Now, we are interested in the initial question, i.e. who
can open the main treasury and at what time. Therefore,
we take the newly created credential and the credentials
reflecting the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order
to open the treasury (2), (13) and, using rule (CWP5), we
conclude that:
T S  F.openTreasury← F.mGuardF.guards
T S τ5 F.mGuard← {Victor}
T S τ2∩τ4 F.guards← {Susan,Victor}
T S τ2∩τ4∩τ5 F.openTreasury←{Susan,Victor}
As a result of this inference, we see that the set of people
who can jointly open the treasury is: {Susan,Victor} in
time: τ2 ∩ τ4 ∩ τ5.
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6.2. Second Scenario – Company’s Quality Policy
Company L has three roles: employee, spec jalist and
controller. The company’s quality policy requires confir-
mation that the product is suitable for use when it has been
checked by two employees, a specialist and a controller. It
can be clearly stated that the two employees must be differ-
ent persons. However, a specialist who is also an employee
can be one of the two employees. The requirement for the
controller is much more restrictive, namely they cannot
simultaneously perform any of the other roles during the
inspection. Therefore, we can save the company’s control
policy using the following set of credentials:
L.2Employees← L.employee⊗L.employee (15)
L.spec jalEmployees← L.spec jalL.2Employees (16)
L.con f irm← L.controller⊗L.spec jalEmployees (17)




L.spec jal← {Claire} (20)
L.controller← {Kim} (21)
Now, using our credentials and using the inference system
from Section 3, we can define a set of people who, act-
ing together, can confirm the quality of products. Using
credentials (15)–(21) and rule (W1), we can conclude that:
L.2Employees← L.employee⊗L.employee∈S
S  L.2Employees← L.employee⊗L.employee
L.spec jalEmployees← L.spec jalL.2Employees∈S
S  L.spec jalEmployees← L.spec jalL.2Employees
L.con f irm← L.controller⊗L.spec jalEmployees ∈S




S  L.employee← {Rita}
L.spec jal← {Claire} ∈S
S  L.spec jal←{Claire}
L.controller← {Kim} ∈S
S  L.controller←{Kim}
Now, using credentials (15), (18), (19) and rule (W6) we
can infer that:
S  L.2Employees← L.employee⊗L.employee
S  L.employee←{Claire}
S  L.employee← {Rita}
{Claire}∩{Rita}= φ
S  L.2Employees← {Claire,Rita}
Now, to appoint a set of people consisting of a specialist and
two different employees, we need to use the newly created
credential, add credentials (16), (20) and rule (W5):
S  L.spec jalEmployees← L.spec jalL.2Employees
S  L.spec jal← {Claire}
S  L.2Employees← {Claire,Rita}
S  L.specjalEmployees← {Claire,Rita}
Now, using the above credential and adding credentials
(17), (21) and rule (W6) we can deduce the following:
S  L.con f irm← L.controller⊗L.spec jalEmployees
S  L.controller← {Kim}
S  L.spec jalEmployees←{Claire,Rita}
{Kim}∩{Claire,Rita}= φ
S  L.confirm←{Claire,Rita,Kim}
which confirms that the set of entities that can jointly con-
firm quality is: {Claire,Rita,Kim}.
As in the previous scenario, we also assume that Claire and
Rita are employees only for a limited period of time. The
same applies to Claire as a specialist and Kim as a con-
troller. To do this, we need to generalize credentials (18)–
(21) by introducing time ranges applying to their validity:
L.employee←{Claire} in τ1 (22)
L.employee←{Rita} in τ2 (23)
L.spec jal← {Claire} in τ3 (24)
L.controller← {Kim} in τ4 (25)
stating that (18), (19), (20), and (21) are only available dur-
ing τ1, τ2, τ3, and during τ4, respectively, while credentials
(15), (16) and (17) are always valid, because they express
certain facts that do not depend on time.
Let us use our time-dependent inference system. We
can use credentials: (15)–(17) and (22)–(25). Using rule
(CWP1) we can conclude that:
L.2Employees← L.employee⊗L.employee∈T S
T S  L.2Employees← L.employee⊗L.employee
L.spec jalEmployees← L.spec jalL.2Employees ∈T S
T S  L.spec jalEmployees← L.spec jalL.2Employees
L.con f irm← L.controller⊗L.spec jalEmployees ∈ T S
T S  L.con f irm← L.controller⊗L.spec jalEmployees
L.employee←{Claire} in τ1 ∈ T S
T S τ1 L.employee←{Claire}
L.employee← {Rita} in τ2 ∈ T S
T S τ2 L.employee← {Rita}
L.spec jal←{Claire} in τ3 ∈T S
T S τ3 L.spec jal←{Claire}
L.controller←{Kim} in τ4 ∈T S
T S τ4 L.controller←{Kim}
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In order to check when two different employees can coop-
erate together, we use credentials (15), (22), (23) and rule
(CWP6) to infer:
T S  L.2Employees← L.employee⊗L.employee
T S τ1 L.employee← {Claire}
T S τ2 L.employee←{Rita}{Claire}∩{Rita}= φ
T S τ1∩τ2 L.2Employees← {Claire,Rita}
In the next step, we use the above credential and add cre-
dentials (16), (24) and rule (CWP5):
T S L.spec jalEmployees←L.spec jalL.2Employees
T S τ5 L.spec jal←{Claire}
T S τ1∩τ2 L.2Employees← {Claire,Rita}
T S τ1∩τ2∩τ5 L.specjalEmployees←{Claire,Rita}
Now, by using the above credential and adding credentials
(17) and (25) and rule (CWP6) we can deduce:
T S  L.con f irm← L.controller⊗L.spec jalEmployees
T S τ6 L.controller← {Kim}
T S τ1 ∩ τ2 ∩ τ5 L.spec jalEmployees←{Claire,Rita}
{Kim}∩{Claire,Rita}= φ
T S τ1 ∩ τ2 ∩ τ5 ∩ τ6 L.confirm← {Claire,Rita,Kim}
which confirms that the set of entities that can jointly
confirm quality is {Claire,Rita,Kim} in time τ1 ∩ τ2 ∩ τ3
∩ τ4.
The above scenarios assume that the security policy cre-
dentials are permanently valid, but this is not required
in any way. Some policies are always time-limited (e.g.
seasonal sales) or are modified after a certain incident or
to reflect changes affecting the company. Introduction of
time-dependent credentials makes it very easy to define the
company’s security policy. As you can see in this sim-
ple scenario, you do not have to change the entire pol-
icy, but only take into account the time range. However,
in the absence of time limits, the company policy should
be changed, which would require, in a real-life scenario,
a considerable amount of work to be performed by those
involved. Such a transfer of rights, conducted for a certain
period of time only, obviously is of great importance when
replacing a specific person at their position. We can assign
certain credentials to the person who replaces us for dura-
tion of our. Then, at the time of our return to work, the
rights of the person who replaces us expire.
6.3. Third Scenario – Submitting an Proposal
The company policy states that in order to submit a pro-
posal for co-financing a specific project, we must deliver it
between 01/06/2019 and 31/07/2019 (τ1).
P.validSend← P.send in τ1
To write the proposal, we need a person who is part of the
information security team (IST).
P.write← P.ist
We know that Mark works at IST.
P.ist←{Mark} in τ2
We also know that Mark is going on vacation in July. Dur-
ing his absence, he will be replaced by Konrad.
if Mark/∈P.ist then P.ist← {Konrad}
After being drawn up, the proposal must be checked by the
IST manager. The manager cannot be the same person who
has written the proposal.
P.check← P.ist⊗→ P.headIST
Luck is the name of the IST head.
P.headIST ← {Luck} in τ3
The proposal, after being checked by the manager, must be
submitted to the project support team, so that a number be
assigned thereto.
P.number← P.pst
After assigning the number, the proposal must be registered
at the office.
P.register← P.o f f ice
Then, the proposal must be submit to the director, for
sign-off.
P.signed← P.director
Once signed, the proposal is registered in the system by an
IST employee.
P.send← P.ist
The specific sequence (creation, signing, numbering, regis-
tering and submission of the proposal) must be maintained.
Considering the uniqueness of the people performing the








→ P.send in τ1
According to rule (CWP1), we can infer:
P.validSend← P.send in τ1 ∈ T S
T S τ1 P.validSend← P.send
P.write← P.ist ∈T S
T S  P.write← P.ist
P.ist←{Mark} in τ2 ∈ T S
T S τ2 P.ist← {Mark}
if Mark/∈P.ist then P.ist← {Konrad} ∈ T S
T S  if Mark/∈P.ist then P.ist← {Konrad}
P.check← P.ist⊗→ P.headIST ∈ T S
T S  P.check← P.ist⊗→ P.headIST
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P.number← P.pst ∈T S
T S  P.number← P.pst
P.register← P.o f f ice ∈T S
T S  P.register← P.o f f ice
P.signed← P.director ∈ T S
T S  P.signed← P.director
P.send← P.ist ∈ T S
T S  P.send← P.ist
Now, by assigning specific individuals to each role, we can
check who, when and under what conditions is capable of
submitting the proposal (with receiving a grant being the
final objective of the process).
As you can see in the scenario in which we have to meet
different conditions, taking into account the importance of
time and the order in which the credentials are made, you
can model it using our inference system. These properties
make it useful in real systems in which similar problems
are faced.
7. Conclusions
In this article, we are developing the RT T language by
adding time limits affecting the validity of credentials, and
by making the validity of a single credential dependent on
the availability or unavailability of other credentials – all
that in the context of execution during actual operation of
a system. This approach shows the impact that small exten-
sions may exert on the applicability of trust management
languages.
Time restrictions are a reasonable extension of credentials,
because credentials are granted to users for a predefined
period of time, rather than indefinitely. As shown in the
scenario, conditional credentials can greatly facilitate the
automation of some processes. The inference systems pre-
sented here are simple, but well-founded theoretically.
The proposed model has been successfully applied to
multi-valued logic, including uncertain information. In
the near future, we plan to use it in other, more complex
cases involving distributed systems whose policies are not
trivial.
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